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COMMENT

SNUFFING OUT THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE FDA REGULATION
OF TOBACCO COMPANY
ADVERTISING AND SPORTS
SPONSORSHIPS UNDER THE FEDERAL

FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT.
BRADFORD J. PATRICK*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Cigarette smoking did not become a large part of society in America
until around 1910, when the Camel brand, the first blended tobacco cigarette, was introduced by R.J. Reynolds.' After peaking in the mid-1950s,
consumption of all forms of tobacco has continued to drop.2 In 1955, the

National Cancer Institute conducted the first large-scale nationwide survey of adult tobacco use patterns and found that 60% of men and 28%
of women were current smokers.3 Today, about 25% of adults in
America are smokers,4 but the percentage of adult women who smoke
has remained largely unchanged since 1955.1 On August 28, 1996, cigarettes and smokeless tobacco became the subject of regulation by the
Food and Drug Administration (hereinafter "FDA") when the Regula* B.S. (Education-Sports Management) University of Dayton, 1990; J.D. candidate, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, 1998.
I. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVICES, SMOKELESS TOBACCO OR HEALTH XXXIX (SMOKING & TOBACCO CONTROL MONOGRAPH 2, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH PUB. No. 93-

3461 (photo. reprint 1993) (1992)) [hereinafter SMOKELESS TOBACCO OR HEALTH].
2. Id. at xli. Forms of tobacco include cigarettes, cigars, pipes, self-rolled cigarettes, leaf,
and snuff.
3. Samuel Broder, Forewordto STRATEGIES To CONTROL TOBACCO UsE IN THE UN rED
STATES, at iii, iii, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVICES (SMOKING & TOBACCO CONTROL MONOGRAPH No. 1, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH PUB. No. 92-3316, 1991) [hereinafter
STRATEGIES To CONTROL TOBACCO USE].
4. Id.
5. Id. at iv. Nearly fifty million persons regularly use cigarettes, and in 1990, 527 billion
cigarettes were smoked in the U.S. See id.
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tion of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (hereinafter "the regulations") was finalized. 6
The regulations create a new part 897 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, which will govern the sale, distribution, labeling, and advertising of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. Subpart D of part 897, governing labeling and advertising, severely restricts billboard advertising
and sports sponsorships by the tobacco industry, and it is comprised of
three sections.
Subsection (c) of section 897.34 will take away the ability of a tobacco company to use its brand names in most sponsorship efforts, and
will also ban the use of any word, color, or item that is used to identify a
tobacco brand, such as using the color red in the case of Marlboro cigarettes, or using the slogan "Marlboro Country." This subsection, effective August 28, 1998, provides in full:
(c) No manufacturer, distributor, or retailer may sponsor or
cause to be sponsored any athletic, musical, artistic, or other social or cultural event, or any entry or team in any event, in the
brand name (alone or in conjunction with any other word), logo,
symbol, motto, selling message, recognizable color or pattern of
colors, or any other indicia of product identification identical or
similar to, or identifiable with, those used for any brand of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco. Nothing in this paragraph prevents a
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer from sponsoring or causing
to be sponsored any athletic, musical, artistic, or other social or
cultural event, or team or entry, in the name of the corporation
which manufactures the tobacco product, provided that both the
corporate name and the corporation were registered and in use in
the United States prior to January 1, 1995, and that the corporate
name does not include any brand name (alone or in conjunction
with any other word), logo, symbol, motto, selling message, recognizable color or pattern of colors, or any other indicia of product
identification identical or similar to, or identifiable with, those
used for any brand of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco. 7
Clothing and other merchandise sales and promotions of the tobacco
companies, such as "Marlboro Gear," will also be banned under section
897.34:

6. Regulation of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 801 et seq.) [hereinafter Regulation of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco].
7. Regulation of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,618 (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. 897.34 (c)).
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(a) No manufacturer and no distributor of imported cigarettes or
smokeless tobacco may market, license, distribute, sell, or cause
to be marketed, licensed, distributed, or sold any item (other than
cigarettes or smokeless tobacco) or service, which bears the brand
name (alone or in conjunction with any other word), logo, symbol, motto, selling message, recognizable color or pattern of colors, or any other indicia of product identification identical or
similar to, or identifiable with, those used for any brand of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco."
(b) No manufacturer, distributor, or retailer may offer or cause
to be offered any gift or item (other than cigarettes or smokeless
tobacco) to any person purchasing cigarettes or smokeless tobacco in consideration of the purchase thereof, or to any person
in consideration of furnishing evidence, such as credits, proofs-ofpurchase, or coupons, of such a purchase.9
Section 897.32 will, effective August 28, 1997, restrict the format, content, and placement of tobacco advertisements to a black text on white
background "tombstone" format:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each
manufacturer, distributor, and retailer advertising or causing to
be advertised, disseminating or causing to be disseminated, any
labeling or advertising for cigarettes or smokeless tobacco shall
use only black text on a white background. This section does not
apply to advertising: (1) In any facility where vending machines
and self-service displays are permitted under this part, provided
that the advertising is not visible from outside the facility and that
it is affixed to a wall or fixture in the facility: or (2) Appearing in
any publication (whether periodic or limited distribution) that the
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer demonstrates is an adult
publication. For the purposes of this section, an adult publication
is a newspaper, magazine, periodical, or other publication: (i)
Whose readers younger than 18 years of age constitute 15 percent
or less of the total readership as measured by competent and reliable survey evidence; and (ii) That is read by fewer than 2 million persons younger than 18 years of age as measured by
competent and reliable survey evidence.
(b) Labeling and advertising in an audio or video format shall be
limited as follows: (1) Audio format shall be limited to words
only with no music or sound effects. (2) Video formats shall be
limited to static black text only on a white background. Any au-

8. Id. at 44,617 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 897.34(a)).
9. Id. at 44,617-618 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 897.34(b)).
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dio with the video shall be limited to words only with no music or
sound effects.1 0
The main thrust of section 897.30, effective August 28, 1997, is its subsection (b):
(b) No outdoor advertising for cigarettes or smokeless tobacco,
including billboards, posters, or placards, may be placed within

1,000 feet of the perimeter of any public playground or playground area in a public park (e.g., a public park with equipment
such as swings and seesaws, baseball diamonds, or basketball

courts), elementary school, or secondary school."
On June 20, 1997, the landscape surrounding tobacco continued its

dramatic change. The tobacco industry and the attorneys general of
forty states agreed to a $368.5 billion settlement to compensate the states
for their costs in treating smoking-related illness, ending the states' lawsuits seeking recovery of those costs, as well as all class-action lawsuits
now and in the future.'" Individual lawsuits could be filed, but capped at
$5 billion a year. 3 Further, the industry agreed to help meet pre-set
goals for the reduction of teen-age smoking by spending at least $500
million on anti-smoking messages, with an end goal of reducing the rate
by sixty percent within ten years, and including an $80 million per year
penalty for each percentage point not reached under the goal.' 4 As part
of the proposed settlement, which still must be ratified by Congress, the
industry agreed to accept the FDA's jurisdiction over tobacco, and further, to end all billboard advertising and sports sponsorships. 5 In addition, Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds would end the use of its "Marlboro
Man" and "Joe the Camel" campaigns respectively.' 6 The historic settle10. Id. (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 897.32(a),(b)).
11. Regulation of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,617 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 897.30(b)).
12. John M. Broder, The Tobacco Agreement: The Overview; Cigarette Makers In A $368
Billion Accord To Curb Lawsuits And Curtail Marketing,N.Y. TiMEs, June 21, 1997, at 1.
13. Id. at 8.
14. Id. at 8. Other provisions include a payment of $50 billion over 25 years to help pay
for the health care for millions of children without insurance, and warning labels that would
state that cigarettes are addictive and cause severe health problems.
15. Id. at 1.
16. Id. at 8. This concession was probably to avoid more litigation, especially in the case
of Joe the Camel. In 1994, the FTC had closed an investigation of the Joe the Camel advertising campaign, finding that it did not lead children to smoke. See FTC Statements Regarding
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company-Camel Cigarettes,FTC NEws RELEASE, June 8, 1994, FTC
File No. 932-3162, 1994 WL 584651 (F.T.C.). Recently, however, the FTC re-opened its 1994
investigation, citing new evidence. See Bruce Ingersoll, Joe Camel Ads Illegally Target Kids,
FTC Says, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1996, at B1. The FTC holds its authority to conduct such
investigations in the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 41, et. seq. (1997). Section 5 of
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ment came soon after a products liability settlement was reached on
March 20, 1997, between the Liggett Company and the attorneys general
of twenty-two states. 7 Representing only two percent of the industry,
Liggett made admissions in the course of its settlement talks that cigarettes are addictive and that the tobacco industry targets children with its
advertisements.' These damaging admissions, and the agreement itself,
forced R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris to come to the settlement table
as well. 19

Still remaining, however, is a legal appeal by the industry, its future
dependent on Congress. Soon after the proposed rule2° was announced
on September 7, 1995, in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, five tobacco companies filed suit against the
FDA and Commissioner David Kessler. On April 25, 1997, District
Judge Osteen granted the tobacco companies' Motion for Summary
Judgment in part and denied it in part in Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. United
States Food & Drug Administration.2 ' While the court found that the

FDA acted under its device authorities in the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act22 in regulating tobacco, the part of the decision that the
industry is now appealing, the court agreed with the tobacco companies

that the "FDA may not restrict advertising and promotion pursuant to
section 360j(e) of the Act."' Subpart D was thus struck down. Importhe Act gives the FTC the ability to conduct subjective investigations based on the "unfairness" of advertisements. See 15 U.S.C. 45 (1997).
17. Anthony Flint, Tobaccofirm cites dangerof smoking, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 1997,
at Al.
18. Id.
19. Liggett has long been involved in lawsuits seeking recovery for damages caused by its
tobacco products. See Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,530-531 (1992) (holding
that the 1965 FCLA Act, infra note 43, did not pre-empt state law damages actions; that the
1969 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, infra note 47, did pre-empt claims based on a
failure to warn; but that the 1969 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act does not pre-empt
claims based on express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy).
The attorneys general found their ability to bring suit in that holding.
20. Regulation of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995) (finalized Aug. 28, 1996).
21. 966 F.Supp. 1374.
22. Id. at 1-19.
23. Id. at 20. While it is the grounds of the industry's appeal, the action of the FDA in
granting itself jurisdiction over tobacco will be assumed to be a proper exercise of its powers
granted by Congress. For the reader interested in the jurisdictional debate, and not just the
constitutional argument against the regulations, compare Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine Withdrawak Assessing the FDA's Effort to Regulate Tobacco Products,48 ALA. L. REv.
1 (1996) (noting that both the lack of an affirmative statement from Congress giving jurisdiction and the FDA's own numerous previous statements that it did not have jurisdiction lead
one to conclude that no jurisdiction exists), with Allison M. Zieve, The FDA's Regulation of

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:139

tant to this paper, if the proposed settlement fails to win approval, the
tobacco industry will then continue its appeal seeking a reversal of Judge
Osteen's decision upholding the FDA's jurisdiction over tobacco, and
the debate over tobacco will rage on.
As Congress debates whether to approve the settlement, this paper
will analyze the constitutionality of subpart D of the FDA Regulations.
In Section VI of this note, it will be concluded that subpart D involves
the impermissible restriction of commercial speech under the First
Amendment. 4 Section II of this note will use the history and value of
the two most prominent tobacco brands involved in advertising and
sports sponsorships, Philip Morris's Marlboro brand and R.J. Reynolds's
Camel brand, as the backdrop to examine the impact of subpart D. Section III of this note will discuss the history of tobacco regulation at both
the federal and state level. Section IV of this note will develop the early
days of the commercial speech doctrine. Section V will discuss the latest
commercial speech decisions, including the Court's most recent, 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island.2" Section VI will explain why subpart D
does not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Lastly, Section VII will end
this note, offering some perspective on where commercial speech protection may be headed and on the nearly century-old debate over how far
the First Amendment was meant to take free speech, whether non-commercial or commercial.
II.

SUBPART

D

AND ITS IMPACT

Section 897.34 would have a tremendous impact, both on the industry
itself and on the events it sponsors. The first commercial racing sponsorship by a tobacco company was in 1968, when the English cigarette com-

Tobacco Products,48 FooD & DRUG L.J. 495 (1996) (arguing that the FDA has merely reacted to the new evidence showing that tobacco companies regulate the amount of nicotine
put into cigarettes and therefore the FDA has jurisdiction over cigarettes as they now can be
classified as a "drug" under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act), and David A. Kessler, et al., The Legal and Scientific Basis for FDA's Assertion of JurisdictionOver Cigarettes
and Smokeless Tobacco, JAMA 405 (1997) (FDA assertion of jurisdiction is proper in light of
new evidence showing tobacco is made to be addictive).
24. The full text of the amendment is as follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
U.S. CoNsT. amend I.
25. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
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pany Gold Leaf sponsored Team Lotus, a Formula One26 racing series
entry.2 7 In the 1990s, sponsorship in the United States is big business.
R.J. Reynolds serves as the well-known title sponsor of the National As-

sociation of Stock Car Auto Racing ("NASCAR") series, "The Winston
Cup,' '28 named after its Winston cigarette brand, and spends over $33
million annually on motor sports.2 9 Philip Morris spends over $18 mil-

lion for its sponsorship of Marlboro IndyCar teams and races, 30 and it
was estimated that all tobacco companies combined would spend $194
million on sports-related sponsorships in 1996.31
A commonly heard suggestion by proponents of section 897.34 is that
the Winston Cup could easily be renamed and simply become the "R.J.

Reynolds Cup." But, this evidences a complete lack of understanding of
the value of a brand name and the efforts taken to establish it; for brand

names are the most valuable assets of a company. Consider the view of
John Stuart, Chairman of Quaker, that "[i]f [Quaker] were to be split up,
I would be glad to take the brands, trademarks and goodwill and you
'32
could have all the bricks and mortar-and I would fare better than you."
Recent sales of brand names back Stuart's claim. In 1988, the European
brand names, not the companies themselves, of R.J.R.-Nabisco were
26. This series is run in Europe and is similar to the United States' two Indy-Car series,
the upstart Indy Racing League (known as the "IRL"), and the Championship Auto Racing
Teams circuit (known as "CART").
27. Gregg Feistman, Under Attack, INDY CAR RACING, Nov. 1995, at 22.
28. The 1997 Winston Cup Series will have 35 races, 32 point-scoring. This series has
become immensily popular. Attendance has risen from 1.55 million fans in 1980, averaging
48,594 per race for 32 races, to 5.58 million in 1996, when 31 races averaged over 180,000 fans
per contest (figures on file with NASCAR).
29. Jeff Jensen, Non-Tobacco Sponsors Could Fill Motor Void; Nascar Popularity Expanding, Likely to Make Up $50 Million Hit, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 2, 1996, at 34 (citing
Chicago-based Int'l Entertainment Group, Inc. ("lEG") Sponsorship Report).
30. Id.
31. Bill Koenig, Auto Racing May Have To Kick Habit; Tobacco companies' sponsorship
money will go up in smoke, If New FederalRules Stand, INDIANAPOLIs STAR, Aug. 24, 1996, at
DOI (citing estimate of EG). These expenditures are only a part of the tobacco industry's
advertising and promotional budgets. The FTC, in its annual report to Congress on cigarette
and smokeless tobacco sales and advertising, reported that in 1994, $4.83 billion was spent on
cigarette advertising and promotion, but nearly 20% less than in 1993 ($6.03 billion). F17C
NEmvs RELEASE, Oct. 9, 1996, 1996 WL 578900 (F.T.C.). Spending on advertising and promotion for smokeless tobacco amounted to nearly $126 million. FTC NEws RELEASE, Jan. 8,
1997, 1997 WL 5569 (F.T.C.).
32. INTERBRAND GROUP, PLC, WORLD'S GREATEST BRANDs 7 (1992). The advertising
and marketing group points out that "[u]nless brands are differentiated no brand personality
exists and the consumer has no reason to select any one brand in preference to another .... [and] the brand must be supported through advertising and other forms of promotion. . . ." Id. at 14.
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sold to the French food company BSN for $2.5 billion.33 Also in 1988,
Philip Morris bought Kraft, paying $12.9 billion, four times the value of
Kraft's "tangible" assets.34 In fact, Philip Morris's Marlboro brand is
ranked as the world's fifth-strongest brand, ahead of such brand names
as IBM, American Express, and Sony.35
Philip Morris, with its Marlboro brand, and R.J. Reynolds, with its
Camel brand, have succeeded in developing and maintaining marketleading brand personalities and positioning. The Camel brand was
started in 1913 and was number one soon after its introduction until
Marlboro's succession to the top by the early 1970s.36 Since then, Camel
has not enjoyed the same success worldwide as Marlboro, but it has had
a comeback in Europe recently by its sponsorship of the Camel Trophy
and Camel Adventure motor sports series.37 The Marlboro brand was
introduced in 1924 to the United States. 38 Philip Morris first aimed its
brand at women. 9 That strategy did not work and in 1955, Philip Morris
redirected its efforts at men by developing the now-famous Marlboro
Man image and the Marlboro Country backdrop.40
The regulations would erase these brand differentiations; over time,
one tobacco product would be virtually indistinguishable from the next.
To take away the tobacco companies' ability to use their brand names in
sports sponsorship efforts would mean more than just removing a name.
It would mean removing potentially billions of dollars in value from
these companies. But, more importantly, it would mean removing the
right to free speech.4 '
III.

THE HISTORY OF TOBACCO REGULATION: FROM THE EARLY

1900s TO

TODAY

Tobacco has been the target for regulation for over a century, both at
the federal level, including previous attempts to give the FDA jurisdic-

tion over tobacco and to regulate tobacco company sports sponsorships
and advertising, and at the state level.
33. Id. at 12.
34. Id.

35. Id. at 22. Coca-Cola led all other brands: The Kellogg brand ranked second, McDonald's third, and Kodak fourth. See id.
36. Id. at 38.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 37.
39. Id.
40. Id.

41. See discussion infra Section V.
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A.

Federal Regulation Of Tobacco, Advertising, and Sports
Sponsorships

In 1964, the Surgeon General came out with its now well-known report on the health hazards of smoking.4 2 In 1965, Congress approved the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising (hereinafter "FCLA")
Act43 , which required all cigarette advertising vehicles, from packages to
print ads to billboards, to contain the following warning: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to your Health. '44 In addition, the
FCLA Act gives the Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter "FTC")
regulatory authority over the cigarette promotional sales and distribution programs used by tobacco companies. 5
Tobacco advertising was next on the list to be regulated. In 1967, the
Federal Communications Commission (hereinafter "FCC") required television stations to provide free air time for anti-smoking messages under
the "fairness doctrine., 4 6 The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
196947 amended the FCLA Act, and banned tobacco companies from
advertising "on any medium of electronic communication subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission,"4 thus elimi-

nating the counter-advertisements as well. For tobacco companies, that
represented a windfall, for not only had they been losing customers, they
were paying for these counter-ads, as the policy of fair access demanded
the broadcast of about one anti-smoking message for every three or four
cigarette ads, which in 1970 dollars amounted to $75 million dollars
worth of annual commercial air time for anti-smoking messages. 49 The
42. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH:
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMnrFEE To THs SURGEON GENERAL PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 2829 (1964).

43. 15 U.S.C. §1331-1341 (1994).
44. 15 U.S.C. §1333 (1994).
45. 15 U.S.C. §1333(a)(1) (1994).
46. Randall H. Stoner, Note, 200 MPH Cigarette Ads: A Comparison Of International
Restrictions On Tobacco Sports Sponsorship, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & Comn'. L. Rv. 639, at 666
(1992) (citing Michael J. Garrison, Should All Cigarette Advertising Be Banned? A First
Amendment and Public Policy Issue, 25 Am.Bus. L.J. 169, 202 (1987)) (citations omitted).
This FCC action was then supported by the courts in Banzhaf v. FCC,405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
47. 15 U.S.C. §1331-1341 (1994).
48. 15 U.S.C. §1335 (1994). For a view by two researchers that the sponsorship by tobacco companies of sports programming circumvents this ban, see Patricia A. Madden & Joel
W. Grube, The Frequency and Nature of Alcohol and Tobacco Advertising in Televised Sports,
84 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 297 (1994).

49. Daniel Helberg, Note and Comment, Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA's Proposed
Restrictions on CigaretteAdvertising Under the Commercial-SpeechDoctrine, 29 Loy. L.A. L.
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broadcasters attempted to fight the statute because of50this large loss of
revenue for their stations, but they were unsuccessful.
In 1984, the FCLA Act was again amended to include more warnings
that must be rotated by the advertiser. 1 Smokeless tobacco did not gain
the attention of Congress until 1986, when Congress passed the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act.52 This Act mirrors
the FCLA Act in its requirements,5 3 including warning labels on products and advertisements,5 4 and a ban on all electronic media. 55
The structure and content of subpart D can be traced to several past
legislative efforts to either ban or severely restrict advertising and sports
sponsorships by tobacco companies. In 1987, two bills were considered
which would have completely banned sports sponsorships and all tobacco advertising, as well as distribution of tobacco samples.5 1 The Tobacco Control and Health Protection Act 57 and, a year earlier, The
Protect our Children from Cigarettes Act of 1989,11 would have severely
REV. 1219, at 1236 (1996) (citing Regulation of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,327 (1995) (finalized Aug. 28, 1996)).
50. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. Cir. 1971), affd, 405 U.S.
1000 (1977).
51. 15 U.S.C. §1333 (c) (1994). The amended warnings read as follows:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risk to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in
Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains
Monoxide.
Id. §1333(a).
52. 15 U.S.C. §4401-4408 (1994).
53. Id.
54. The warnings are as follows:
WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE MOUTH CANCER

Carbon

WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE GUM DISEASE AND TOOTH LOSS
WARNING: THIS
CIGARETTES.

PRODUCT

IS NOT

A SAFE

ALTERNATIVE

TO

Id. §4402 (a)(1).
55. Id. §4402 (f).
56. Charles J. Harder, Comment, Is it Curtainsfor Joe Camel? A CriticalAnalysis of the
1995 FDA ProposedRule to Restrict Tobacco Advertising,Promotionand Sales to Protect Children and Adolescents, 16 Loy. L.A. ENrr. L.J. 399, at 403-404 (1995) (discussing H.R. 1272,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) and H.R. 1532, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)).
57. H.R. 5041, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
58. H.R. 1250, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
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restricted sports sponsorships and advertising.5 9 In addition, during the
past ten years, several other bills have been introduced, but none were
enacted.6 o
B.

Legislative and Judicial Challenges Made To The Current
Regulations

Over the past several decades, many attempts have been made to
give the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco. 6 ' Congressional approval of the
settlement will involve anything but a "rubber stamp." Congress became involved before the regulations were even finalized, announcing
three bills in the House, each one seeking to eliminate the regulations.62
The Senate also became involved in the debate, introducing two bills in
the first session of 1995.63

Additionally, the decision of Judge Osteen still stands for now. Subpart D could not stand because section 360j(e) of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not encompass such a regulation.' In relevant part, this section provides that:
(1) The Secretary may by regulation require that a device be restricted to sale, distribution, or use - (A) only upon the written
or oral authorization of a practitioner licensed by law to administer or use such device, or (B) upon such other conditions as the
Secretary may prescribe in such regulation, if, because of its potentiality for harmful effect or the collateral measures necessary
to its use, the Secretary determines that there cannot otherwise
be reasonable assurance of its safety and effectiveness....
59. Stoner, supra note 46, at 648-649 (pointing out that the language of the Act included
the "tombstone" format, the 1000 foot advertising ban around schools, and a brand-name
sports sponsorship ban).
60. Michael Whatley, Note, The FDA v Joe Camek An Analysis of the FDA's Attempt to
Regulate Tobacco and Tobacco Products Underthe FederalFood, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 22 J.
LEGis 121, at 124, n.27 (1996) (discussing H.R. 3294, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1494
and S. 769, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 4350 and S. 2298, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992);
H.R. 2147 and S. 672, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)).
61. Id. at 122-125.
62. Id. at 131-132 (discussing the Motor Sports Protection Act, H.R. 2265, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995); the bill referred to as the Tobacco Farmer Protection Act, H.R. 2238(1)(a),
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); and the Youth Smoking Prevention Act of 1995, H.R. 2414,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)).
63. Id. at 132-133 (discussing the Tobacco Products Control Act of 1995, § 1262, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); and The Motorsports Protection Act, § 1295, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995)).
64. Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 1997 WL 200007
(M.D.N.C.), at 20.
65. Id.
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The court found that "both as ordinarily defined and as used in the
phrase 'may.. .be restricted to sale, distribution, or use,' the word 'sale'
does not encompass the advertising or promotion of a product., 66 Inquiring into the intent of Congress when it enacted this section, the court
pointed out that "as Plaintiffs note, although Congress expressly used
the words 'offer for sale' and 'advertising' or 'advertisements' elsewhere
in the FDCA, it chose not to use such language in section 360j(e)." 67
Hypothesizing that "[e]ven if 'sale' as used within section 360j(e),
could be construed to encompass the advertising and promotion of a
product.. .the section's grant of authority to the FDA to impose 'other
conditions'.. .does not authorize the FDA to restrict advertising and promotion. '68 The court found that "[t]he phrase 'other conditions' must be
construed within the context of section 360j(e) and other relevant sections of the FDCA, ' , 69 and made the finding that the authorization under
section 360j(e) for the FDA to "provide a reasonable assurance of safety
and effectiveness" did not include the ability to restrict advertising and
promotion of a product. 70 Comparing other FDCA sections to this section, the court held that "the fact that Congress has specifically granted
to the FDA the authority to regulate advertising of restricted devices in a
separate section [sections 353(q), 352(r)] supports the court's finding
that Congress did not intend to grant the FDA such authority under section 360j(e).'
C. State Regulation Of Tobacco

Marketing of cigarettes began to increase at the start of this century,
in part as a response to the public health campaigns that were being
waged against it.72 In response to the marketing of a new, milder form
of tobacco than the cigar tobacco previously used for cigarettes, many
community leaders sponsored anti-cigarette campaigns that by the early
1920s had resulted in either prohibitions or limitations on cigarette
smoking in most states.73 But, the laws failed to impact smoking rates,
and by 1927 only sales to minors were prohibited in only a few states.7 4
66. Id. (footnote omitted).
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 21.
Coyne Beahm, Inc., 1997 WL 200007 (M.D.N.C.) at 20.
Id.

71. Id,(footnote omitted).
72. Elizabeth Edmundson et al., Approaches Directed to the Individual,in STRATEoIS To
CONTROL TOBACCO UsE, supra note 3, at 145, 147.
73. Id. at 148.
74. Id.
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Today, the sale of tobacco to minors is illegal in every state.75 While the
states have not directly addressed sports sponsorship by tobacco companies, the Justice Department in 1995 planned to file suit against Philip
Morris for alleged violations of the statutory ban on tobacco television
commercials 76 before the company agreed to remove advertisements
from the view of television cameras in sports arenas and stadiums located in numerous states. 7 Finally, nearly every state and at least five

hundred local governments have put restrictions on smoking in various
public places.7 8

IV.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH

The commercial speech doctrine under the First Amendment has
been developed by decisions of the Court during the past twenty years.
But, the protection for commercial speech has evolved more quickly
79
since the mid-1990s.
A.

The Early Development of the Commercial Speech Doctrine

In Valentine v. Chrestensen,80 the appellant contended that as he was

engaged in a protected political protest on one side of his handbill, the
other side of his handbill that advertised his submarine tours could not
remove that protection.8 ' But, Justice Roberts cited no authority82 in
decreeing that "[w]e are.. .clear that the Constitution imposes no such
75. Regulation of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,397 (1996) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 801, et seq.)
76. Supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
77. Bruce Horovitz, Cigarettefirm to shift ads out of TV range, USA TODAY, June 7,
1995, at 1A (reporting that billboards at 14 pro football stadiums, 14 baseball parks and five
basketball/hockey arenas would be moved).
78. Jef I. Richards, Politicizing Cigarette Advertising, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 1147, 1179
(1996) (citing Wayne Hearn and Laurie Jones, Kicking Butts: Anti-Smoking Troops Relish
Victories, but the War Isn't Over Yet, AM. MED. NEws, Apr. 25, 1994, at 3).
79. See discussion infra Section IV.
80. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Chrestensen was a Florida citizen and owner of a former United
States Navy submarine who decided to bring his submarine up to New York City in 1940 to
exhibit it there. After being told that his first handbill violated a city sanitary code, but a code
which allowed political advertisements, he then made the double-sided handbill.
81. Id. at 55.
82. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech? , 76 VA. L.
REv. 627, (1990) (pointing out that "the Supreme Court plucked the commercial speech doctrine out of thin air"). See also, Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820 n.6 (1975) ("MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, who was a Member of the Court when Chrestensen was decided and who
joined that opinion, has observed: 'The ruling was casual, almost offhand. And it has not
survived reflection') (citation omitted).
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restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising."83
Thus, the exception for commercial speech was born, providing it with
no protection under the First Amendment. It would not be until over
thirty years later that the court would show that it would no longer summarily exclude commercial speech from First Amendment protection.'
In Bigelow v. Virginia, 85 the Court stated that "[Valentine] obviously

does not support any sweeping proposition that advertising is unprotected per se. This Court's cases decided since Chrestensen clearly
demonstrate as untenable any reading of that case that would give it so
broad an effect. 8' 6 Bigelow involved a weekly newspaper publisher in
Virginia, where abortions were illegal, who carried advertisements for
abortion services in New York, where abortions were legal. In doing so,
the publisher violated a Virginia statute which prohibited abortion services advertising. The Court, while explaining that Virginia "has a legitimate interest in maintaining the quality of medical care provided wvithin
its borders," held that the statute was impermissibly aimed at New
York's providers.8 7 But, earlier in its opinion, the Court had allowed
that "[ajdvertising, like all public expression, may be subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest. . . . [But]

[a]dvertising is not thereby stripped of all First Amendment protection.
The relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services
does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas."8 8
Importantly, Bigelow was not solely decided on a commercial speech
ground, as the publisher's second appeal was heard in the wake of two
highly-charged cases legalizing abortion. 9 Not surprisingly, in light of
the deeply emotional and political atmosphere surrounding abortion
then, and still continuing today, the Court remarked that "[t]he advertisement published in appellant's newspaper did more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It contained factual material of clear
'public interest.' Portions of its message... involve the exercise of the
freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion."9
83. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54.
84. For a discussion of the commercial speech exception and its development, see EDWIN
P. ROME & WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, CoRpoRATE AND COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH 11-39
(1985).

85. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
86. Id. at 820.
87. Id. at 827 (citation omitted).
88. Id. at 826 (citations and footnotes omitted).
89. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
90. 421 U.S. at 822. Here, the Court distinguished Valentine and Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Human Rel. Comn'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). That case involved an advertiser who published
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Finally, in its next term, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,Inc.,91 the Court announced that it was

faced with an advertisement solely commercial in nature: "Some fragment of hope for the continuing validity of a 'commercial speech' exception arguably might have persisted because of the subject matter of the
advertisement in Bigelow ....

Here, in contrast, the question whether

there is a First Amendment exception for 'commercial speech' is
squarely before us."92 Thus, the continuing validity of the commercial
speech exception would finally be decided. The appellees were prescription drug consumers who challenged a Virginia statute that did not allow
licensed pharmacists to advertise prescription drug prices, claiming that
it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
First, examining the interests of the advertiser, the Court held that
while "we may assume that the advertiser's interest is a purely economic
one" such an interest "hardly disqualifies him from protection under the
First Amendment."94 Looking next to the consumer, the Court held
that:
As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener
by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate.... Generalizing, society also may have a strong interest in
the free flow of commercial information. Even an individual advertisement, though entirely 'commercial,' may be of general public interest. 95
The state argued that price advertising would result in price competition
that would erode the professional standards of the pharmacy industry,
harming consumers and eliminating the most professional pharmacists,
or in the alternative, prices might not drop, and instead, the cost of advertising would be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.9 6
So, to protect its citizens, the state must forbid price advertising. 97
job opportunities preferenced by sex. The Court there held that the publisher's argument that
the commercial speech exception of Valentine no longer deserved recognition and would not
be entertained because the advertisement concerned the illegal activity of sex discrimination.
See 413 U.S. at 388.
91. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
92. Id. at 760-761.
93. Id. at 749.
94. Id. at 762.
95. Id. at 763-764.
96. 425 U.S. at 767-768.
97. Id. at 767.
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The Court responded that there was "an alternative to this highly
paternalistic approach. . .open the channels of communication rather
than to close them."98 Then, ending over thirty years of debate, the
Court decided that "commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected .... ."99 But, the Court qualified its holding by stating that "we of

course do not hold that it can never be regulated in any way. Some
forms of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible,"'10 such
as deceptive advertising. 10 The Court continues to follow this reasoning in cases involving advertising by other professionals. 0 2
98. Id. at 770.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 425 U.S. at 771. The Court explained:
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we have not
held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There are commonsense differences between speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction,'
and other varieties. Even if the differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject to complete suppression by the State, they
nonetheless suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the
flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired. The truth of
commercial speech may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator... Also, commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua
non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely. Attributes such as these, the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate
statements for fear of silencing the speaker.
See id. at n.24 (citing PittsburghPress Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, at 385
(1973)).
102. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (truthful attorney price
advertising protected by the First Amendment). But cf Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S.
447 (1978) (attorneys not allowed to use in-person solicitation of automobile accident victims
due to the vulnerable status of such victims); see also, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S.
Ct. 2371 (1995) (Florida Bar Rule which prohibited attorneys from using direct mail to solicit
wrongful death and personal injury victims within 30 days of the accident was allowable under
the First Amendment). But cf.In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (while the Missouri Supreme
Court Rules can regulate the advertising of attorneys, it can not do so in a way that is more
extensive than necessary to further its interest in protecting the public from misleading advertisements); see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626 (1985) (while state can regulate deceptive advertisements, it can not ban the use of
illustrations and the mere solicitation of legal services); see also Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (state can not universally prohibit lawyers from sending letters
soliciting business from persons with known problems). Compare Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of
Bus. & Prof. Regulation, 114 S.Ct. 2084 (1994) (state board can not prohibit an attorney from
using the designations of CPA (certified public accountant) and CFP (certified financial planner), as advertising such names is not deceptive and is not misleading), and Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761 (1993) (see infra text accompanying notes 129-131), with Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1 (1979) (state of Texas can prohibit the use of trade names by optometrists because of
their potential to mislead the public).
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B. The Refinement of Commercial Speech Protection
In 1980, the Court decided Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission of New York."°3 Similar to Virginia Pharmacy, as a state again chose the paternalistic action of trying to achieve
its non-speech objective by suppressing truthful information about a lawful activity, the Court now developed a four-part test to determine
whether a regulation of commercial speech would be allowable under
the First Amendment:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and
not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether
it is not
04
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
This test marked a change from its traditional test of whether the governmental action involved "illegitimate paternalistic means."'0°
The Court was faced with a New York State regulation that banned
any advertisement by electric utility companies during the 1970s energy
crunch that promoted the use of electricity. While holding that the regulation met the first three parts of its new test, 0 6 the Court held that the
regulation failed the fourth part of its test, as it was too extensive in light
0 7
of the many other alternatives available to promote saving energy,
and thus, the regulation violated the First Amendment. 08
C. A Step Backward: A Reduction in Protectionfor Commercial
Speech
In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico,10 9 a 5-4 decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of
the court and granted the legislature of Puerto Rico great deference in
not requiring any evidence of how a ban on gambling advertising would
103. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
104. Id. at 566.
105. RoMaE & ROBERTS, supra note 84, at 125. The authors describe the standard employed by the Court as "a hybrid between the rational relationship standard and the strict
scrutiny standard, with the least restrictive means requirement added on." Id. at 119.
106. 447 U.S. at 566-569.
107. Id. at 569-571.
108. Id. at 571.
109. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
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directly advance the island's interest in preventing moral decay. 110 The
Court had skipped to that prong without requiring the legislature to
show how gambling "would produce serious harmful effects," thus giving
the island a substantial interest to be addressed by the restriction on
commercial speech."' Completing its deferential analysis, the Court accepted the legislation as narrowly tailored because it was aimed only at
preventing residents from seeing advertisements, not tourists, and further, the Court did not require the legislature to use counter-speech, or
another non-speech suppressing alternative, instead of the advertising
ban. 112 Not content to end its opinion after holding that the legislature3
had met the test, the Court also approved the now-disavowed logic"
that since the island has the greater power to completely prohibit gambling, it must, therefore, also have the lesser power to simply ban advertising about gambling." 4
In 1989, in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v.
Fox," 5' the Court further reduced the protection given commercial
speech when it held that, under Central Hudson's fourth prong, it need
not be shown that "the manner of restriction is absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end.""' 6 Now, the Court only would
ask for a reasonable "'fit' between the.. .ends and the means chosen to
accomplish those ends. 11 7 The Court continued to leave commercial
speech largely unprotected with its decision in United States v. Edge
BroadcastingCo." 8 In Edge Broadcasting,a television broadcaster chal110. Id. at 342. See, e.g., Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509 (1981)
(while applying Central Hudson's third prong, the Court remarked that "[w]e.. .hesitate to
disagree with the accumulated, common-sense judgments of local lawmakers and of the many
reviewing courts that billboards are real and substantial hazards to traffic safety") (footnote

omitted).
111. 478 U.S. at 341.
112. Id. at 343-344.
113. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996):
Contrary to the assumption made in Posadas, we think it quite clear that banning
speech may sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning conduct... As a matter
of First Amendment doctrine, the Posadas syllogism is even less defensible. The text of
the First Amendment makes clear that the Constitution presumes that attempts to regulate speech are more dangerous than attempts to regulate conduct.

Id. at 1512.
114. 478 U.S. at 345-346.
115. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
116. Id. at 480.
117. Id. (quoting Posadas,478 U.S. at 341).
118. 509 U.S. 418 (1993). But see, Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328
(9th Cir. 1997) (holding that regulations which criminalized the broadcast of advertisements
for casino gambling not consistent with the First Amendment). The Ninth Circuit cited 44
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lenged a federal statute that prohibited state lottery commercials to be
run on a television station located in a state where lotteries were illegal.
Over 90% of the station's listeners were from Virginia, where lotteries
were legal, but the broadcaster was located in North Carolina, where
lotteries were illegal. The Court reasoned that it could not determine
whether the government interest sought to be achieved, namely the protection of the non-lottery states' policies on gambling, was directly advanced or not under the third prong of CentralHudson solely by looking
at its effects by banning one broadcaster's advertisements, as the statute
also applies to all other North Carolina stations.119 Once again, as in
Posadas,the Court gave great deference to the government, and did not
require a showing of how gambling advertisements increased the demand for gambling, before holding that the statute was permissible. 20
V. Tim LATEST COMMERCIAL SPEECH DECISIONS
In 1996, in 44 Liquormart,Justice Stevens, delivering the judgment of
the Court, disavowed much of Posadas'sreasoning:
[O]n reflection, we are now persuaded that Posadas erroneously
performed the First Amendment analysis... Because the 5-to-4
decision in Posadas marked such a sharp break from our prior
precedent, and because it concerned a constitutional question
about which this Court is the final arbiter,
we decline to give force
2
to its highly deferential approach.' '
Before 44 Liquormart, in two decisions barely one month apart, 22
the Court showed its willingness to restore and even to expand the level
of protection given commercial speech by its decisions before Posadas.
A.

The Start of Heightened Protection For Commercial Speech

In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,"z the city of Cincinnati
revoked a permit given to the respondent companies that allowed them
to distribute free magazines on public property throughout the city in
sixty-two newsracks, asserting the interest to be protected by the ban on
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996), in its opinion: "While 44 Liquormart
fails to present a coherent framework for reviewing these claims, one point is clear: the government's asserted interest in reducing demand for casino gambling seems less likely to succeed following the Court's decision." 107 F.3d at 1334.
119. 509 U.S. at 427.
120. Id. at 434.
121. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1511 (1996).
122. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410 (decided March 24, 1993), and
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (decided April 26, 1993).
123. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
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the magazines, labeled as "commercial handbills," as protecting the aesthetics and safety of the city streets and sidewalks. 24 The city still allowed almost two thousand other newsracks to remain in place which
were used to distribute newspapers, but as the city labeled them noncommercial, they were allowed to remain in place."2 Due to this fact,
the Court held that the city ban failed the third prong, as the ordinance
did not directly advance the interests asserted. 26 Then, the Court went
on to hold that the fourth prong also had not been met, as the elimination of only sixty-two newsracks was not narrowly tailored enough to
accomplish the goal of aesthetics and safety, as the ban still allowed almost two thousand other newsracks to remain. 27 The Court dismissed
the city's main argument, offering the first sign that the Court was increasing the low level of protection given commercial speech in Posadas:
The major premise supporting the city's argument is the proposition that commercial speech has only a low value...

We cannot

agree. In our view, the city's argument attaches more importance
to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech
than our cases warrant and seriously underestimates the value of
commercial speech 28Barely one month after Discovery Network, the Court clearly placed
the burden on the party seeking approval of a regulation that restricts
commercial speech to show that it meets First Amendment scrutiny with
its decision in Edenfield v. Fane.12 9 The Florida Board of Accountancy
had a rule that prohibited in-person, direct, and uninvited solicitation of
new clients by accountants. However, the Court held that the board had
failed to meet its burden of showing how its rule directly advanced its
substantial interest in preventing fraud by accountants, stating that the
danger to the profession of accountants who would be eager to earn
business by bending the rules was not backed up by any studies or other
evidence of the reality of these dangers.'30 The Court, in bold language,
which offers great protection for tobacco advertising and sports sponsorship and none for the FDA, strengthened the third prong of Central
Hudson by holding that "[t]his burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a re124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 418.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 425-426.
Id. at 427-428.

128. 507 U.S. at 418-419.
129. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).

130. Id. at 770-771.
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striction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it
recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a
'
material degree." 131
B.

The Solidification of Commercial Speech Protection

In Rubin v. Coors,13 2 a 1995 decision which dealt with a federal statute that prohibited beer labels from displaying the percentage of alcohol,
the government asserted that the interest to be served by the statute, was
the protection of the welfare of its citizens from beer brewers who might
133
engage in competition, by increasing the amounts of alcohol in beer.
The Court followed Edenfield in its analysis of the CentralHudson third
prong and required that the government show how the regulation advances its interest "in a direct and material way.' 34 Continuing to follow Edenfield, the Court would not allow the government to satisfy its
burden "by mere speculation and conjecture; rather, a governmental
body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restrictions will in fact
alleviate them to a material degree. '1 35 The Court held that the government had failed to meet its burden, as the ban on putting alcohol content
on labels could not materially, nor directly, advance the government's
asserted interest, because the act at the same time allowed advertisements to mention alcohol content, which most states did not legislate
against, and further, that wines and hard alcohol were both not only allowed but required to print their alcohol contents on a label. 3 6
C.

The Latest Commercial Speech Decision

In the Court's most recent commercial speech decision, 44 Liquormart,the State of Rhode Island prohibited the advertisement of liquor prices. Justice Stevens delivered the judgment of the Court, but
four opinions were written.'3 7 In Part V of his opinion, Justice Stevens
applied, but modified, CentralHudson's four-part test, and the rest of his
colleagues concurred in the judgment that reversed the First Circuit
131. Id. at 770-771 (citations omitted).
132. 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
133. Id. at 1588.
134. Id. at 1592 (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. 761, at 798 (1993)).
135. Id. (quoting 507 U.S. 761 at 798).
136. Id. at 1592.
137. For another discussion of this decision and its four opinions in more detail, see Sean
P. Costello, Comment, Strange Brew: The State of Commercial Speech JurisprudenceBefore
and After 44 Liquormart,Inc., v. Rhode Island, 47 CAsE W. R-s. L. Rnv. 681 (1997).
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Court of Appeals decision,'138 holding that the statutory ban on liquor
price advertising did not meet scrutiny under the First Amendment. 39
The 9-0 decision was somewhat surprising, as until this decision, Chief
Justice Rehnquist could aptly be called "the great dissenter" in the decisions by the Court favoring commercial speech protection under the
First Amendment. 4 ' But now, even the Chief Justice disavowed the
analysis of the third and fourth prongs performed in Posadas, joining
Justices Souter and Breyer in the concurrence of Justice O'Connor:
Since Posadas...this Court has examined more searchingly the
State's professed goal, and the speech restriction put into place to
further it, before accepting a State's claim that the speech restriction satisfies First Amendment scrutiny...

The closer look that

we have required since Posadas comports better with the purpose
of the analysis set out in Central Hudson, by requiring the State
to show that the speech restriction directly advances its interest
and is narrowly tailored. 4 '
The parties in 44 Liquormarthad already stipulated that the first and
second prongs were met. 42 Justice Stevens then made the Edenfield
standard for the third prong even more stringent by requiring that the
state show that its ban would "significantly advance" the state's interest,'143 and held that the state had failed to meet its burden, as "the State
has presented no evidence to suggest that its speech prohibition will significantly reduce market-wide consumption.""
Justice Stevens also
modified the fourth prong of CentralHudson, which the Court most recently modified in Fox to require only that the state show "a reasonable
fit" between a speech restriction and its ends sought to be achieved to
meet this prong.' 45 Making it more difficult for regulations seeking to
abridge commercial speech to be upheld, Justice Stevens held that it
138. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded,
116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
139. 116 S. Ct. at 1515.
140. Richards, supra note 78, at 1162-63 (pointing out that since 1975, the Chief Justice
has dissented in ten cases, making up most of the cases which gave commercial speech some

protection).
141. 116 S. Ct. at 1522 (O'Connor, J. concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
142. 829 F.Supp 543, at 551 (D.R.I. 1993).
143. 116 S. Ct. at 1509 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)).
144. 116 S. Ct. at 1509. On this modification's impact, on the standard of review to be
used, see Costello, supra note 137, at 729 (commenting that "Justice Stevens' insistence on
proof that the means significantly advance the end clearly sets an evidentiary hurdle that more
closely resembles strict scrutiny than rational or intermediate level review") (emphasis in orig-

inal omitted).
145. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, at 480 (1989).
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would be violated where there exists "alternative forms of regulation
that would not involve any restriction on speech [that] would be more
likely to achieve the State's goal.. ."146 Pointing out the existence of

numerous alternatives, as the Court did in Rubin v. Coors, 4 7 Justice Stevens held that Rhode Island had failed to meet its burden under prong
four. 1 48 In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor saw the state's regulation
as failing only the fourth prong of CentralHudson, because the advertising ban was too extensive in light of the many other alternative
methods
49
to accomplish the interest of promoting temperance.
Justice Thomas offered the most protection for commercial speech.
After having applied the Central Hudson test, just a year earlier, in his
opinion for the Court, in Rubin, he now argued that the test should not
have been applied here, and further, that it should no longer be used by
the Court:
In cases such as this, in which the government's asserted interest
is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to
manipulate their choices in the marketplace, the balancing test
adopted in Central Hudson... should not be applied... Rather,
such an 'interest' is per se illegitimate and can no more justify
regulation of 'commercial'50 speech than it can justify regulation of
'noncommercial' speech.'
After reasoning that the third and fourth prongs of the test may lead to
incorrect results, depending on the facts of each subject sought to be
regulated,' Justice Thomas argued that he "would adhere to the doctrine adopted in Virginia Pharmacy Bd. and in Justice Blackmun's Central Hudson concurrence, that all attempts to dissuade legal choices by
citizens by keeping them ignorant are impermissible."'" 2 Thomas' views
garnered immediate support. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia wrote
that he "share[s] Justice Thomas's discomfort with the Central Hudson
test, which seems to me to have nothing more than policy intuition to
support it."' 53 Interestingly, in light of his application of the Central
Hudson test in 44 Liquormart,Justice Stevens had expressed a similar
view in his concurrence in Rubin, remarking that "the borders of the
commercial speech category are not nearly as clear as the Court has as146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

116 S. Ct. at 1510.
115 S. Ct. at 1593.
116 S. Ct. at 1510.
Id. at 1521-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1515-1516 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1518-1520.
Id. at 1520.
116 S. Ct. at 1515 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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sumed, and its four-part test is not related to the reasons for allowing
more regulation of commercial speech than other speech."' 54
VI.

SUBPART

D Is UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Subpart D of the regulations fails to withstand scrutiny under the
First Amendment. The regulations fail to withstand scrutiny when the
Central Hudson test, as modified by 44 Liquormart,155 is applied to this
abridgment of commercial free speech. In addition, subpart D involves
an impermissible viewpoint and content-based discrimination, even
when it is considered
that children are sought to be protected by the
156
regulations.
A. Applying the Central Hudson Test As Modified By 44 Liquormart
While the arguments made by Justice Thomas in 44 Liquormartare
very persuasive and may prove to be so in future commercial speech
cases involving adults, they will not prove persuasive in the context of
deciding the constitutionality of the FDA Regulations. This is so because tobacco use by children is illegal and therefore any regulation
seeking to prevent this use by children would not involve, in the words of
Justice Thomas in 44 Liquormart, "impermissible" governmental "attempts to dissuade legal choices by citizens by keeping them ignorant...,,157 Therefore, the CentralHudson test, as applied, but modified,
by Justice Stevens in 44 Liquormart,will be used to put subpart D of the
FDA Regulations to scrutiny under the First Amendment.
1. Subpart D Concerns Lawful, Truthful Advertising
Subpart D meets prong one of the test, as its sections 897.30, 897.32,
and 897.34 seek to regulate a lawful product, tobacco, whose product
advertising is not misleading. 58 If the advertisements were misleading,
the test would end here. An argument is frequently heard that tobacco
advertising is misleading, "because no cigarette advertising gives adequate warning of the wide range of serious and life threatening diseases
154. 115 S. Ct. 1585, at 1595 (1995) (Stevens, J. concurring) (citations omitted).
155. Supra text accompanying notes 143-48.
156. See infra discussion Section VI(B).

157. 116 S. Ct. 1495, at 1520 (Thomas, J. concurring) (emphasis added).
158. For an argument that its product advertising, in particular the Joe Camel advertising
campaign of R.J. Reynolds, is misleading, and that therefore, the Central Hudson test would
be quickly ended, see John Harrington, Note, Up In Smoke: The FTC's Refusal to Apply the
"Unfairness Doctrine" to Camel Cigarette Advertising, 47 FED. COM. L. J. 593, at 608-10

(1995).
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induced by the ordinary use of the product... Smoking is portrayed as
not harmful, by associating it with traditionally young, healthy, athletic,
and virile activities."'159 But, such an argument seriously misunderstands
tobacco advertising, as in the words of one commentator, "[t]his rationale for the suppression of tobacco advertising is truly puzzling, in light of
the fact that, unlike advertising for virtually any other lawful product,
tobacco advertising is already required by government to place a variety
of explicit warnings concerning the dangers of smoking."' 60 In addition,
as another commentator has plainly argued, "[t]obacco is a legal product. . .it is difficult to deceive consumers about a product with well16
known attributes.' '
2. The Asserted Governmental Interest Is Substantial
The regulations have, as their purpose, the establishment of "restrictions on the sale, distribution, and use of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco in order to reduce the number of children and adolescents who
use these products, and to reduce the life-threatening consequences associated with tobacco use."' 16 2 The substantiality of the FDA's asserted
purpose will not be disputed, as tobacco use by children is a significant
problem in our country. About 3000 teenagers take up smoking each
day, 163 and they usually begin using between grades six through nine,
with very few tobacco users starting after high school.' 64 In 1991, about
19% of high school seniors smoked cigarettes daily, but down from a
high of nearly 29% for the senior class of 1977.165
159. Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IoWA L. REv.
589, at 608 (1996) (citing Vincent Blasi & Henry P. Monaghan, The First Amendment and
CigaretteAdvertising, 256 JAMA 502, 506 (1986) (authors in favor of a constitutional ban on
tobacco advertising)).
160. Redish, supra note 159, at 609 (citation omitted).
161. Richards, supra note 78, at 1152.
162. Regulation of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,616 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.2).
163. Broder, Foreword to STRATEGIE S To CONTROL TOBACCO UsE, supra note 3, at iv.
164. LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., SMOKING, DRINKING, AND ILLICIT DRUG USE AMONG
AMERICAN SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS, COLLEGE STUDENTS, AND YOUNG ADULTSVOL. 1, SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS, 1975-1991, at 14, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN

SERVIcES (NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH PUB.No. 93-3480, 1992).

This on-going study has surveyed high school seniors since the class of 1975, and beginning
in 1991, eighth and tenth graders were added to the study. Id. at 1. The nationwide study uses
very large subject groups, using 18,000 students from 160 eighth-grade schools; tenth graders130 schools, 16,000 students; and seniors-125 to 135 schools since inception of the study, consisting of 15,000 to 17,000 students. Id. at 25.
165. Id. at 75, table 14. The trends in daily and half-pack use have fluctuated since the
study began:
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3. The FDA Can Not Meet Prong Three
The FDA can not meet its burden of showing how subpart D directly
and materially advances its interest in ending tobacco use by children.
One widely-cited study found that six-year-old children could recognize
"Joe the Camel" just as easily as Mickey Mouse. 166 However, the researchers failed to find a causal connection between this recognition and
initiation, required by 44 Liquormart,1 67 concluding that "[i]t is obviously impossible to predict how the exposure of children to environmen'168
tal tobacco advertising might influence their later smoking behavior.
While tobacco advertising has been targeted for its supposed ability
to make children begin tobacco use, 16 9 many studies clearly point to
other reasons for initiation. Use of tobacco has been found in numerous
studies to directly correspond to low levels of education. 170 One study
Daily cigarette use: High of 28.8% in 1976 and in 1977; down to 20.3% in 1981; dropping to 18.1% by 1988 (lowest in study); up to 19.1% in 1990; drop down to 18.5% in
1991. Id.
Rates for half-pack or more use: Peak of 19.4% in 1977; down to 13.5% in 1981; at
10.7% in 1991. Id.
The rates by racial group are quite different, with 21% of white seniors, 12% of hispanic, and only 5% of black seniors smoking daily. Id. at 68. In fact, blacks have a
much lower rate of smoking at all grade levels, Id
166. Paul M. Fischer et al., Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years:
Mickey Mouse and Old Joe the Camel, 266 JAMA 3145, 3147 (1991). The researchers conclude, without direct, supporting evidence, that this knowledge of cigarette logos is "most
likely the result of their exposure to environmental tobacco advertising," such as movies, billboards, and promotional displays and items. Id. at 3148 (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Supra text accompanying notes 143-44.
168. Fischer, supra note 166, at 3148.
169. Nicola Evans et al., Influence of Tobacco Marketing and Exposure to Smokers on
Adolescent Susceptibility to Smoking, 87 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1538, 1545 (1995) (concluding
that "tobacco marketing may be a stronger current influence in encouraging adolescents to
initiate the smoking uptake process than demographic characteristics, perceived school performance, or exposure to other smokers in the peer or family network"); see also, John P.
Pierce et al., Does Tobacco Advertising Target Young People to Start Smoking?, 266 JAMA
3154, 3158 (1991) (concluding that their findings "suggest that tobacco advertising is causally
related to young people becoming addicted to cigarettes; the sum of this evidence is considerable although not yet complete"); see also, Joseph R. DiFranza et al., RJR Nabisco's Cartoon
Camel Promotes Camel Cigarettesto Children,266 JAMA 3149, 3152 (1991) (concluding that
the Joe Camel campaign and other tobacco advertisements "promotes and maintains nicotine
addiction among children and adolescents").
170. For an understanding of this connection, see Luis G. Escobedo & John P. Peddicord,
Smoking Prevalence in US Birth Cohorts: The Influence of Gender and Education,86 AM. J.
PUBLIC HEALTH 231, 234-235 (1996) (finding that more than 50% of White and African
American women with less than a high school education smoked); see also, John P. Pierce et
al., Smoking Initiation by Adolescent Girls, 1944 Through 1988, 271 JAMA 608, 610 (1994)
(finding that between 1967 and 1973, the increase in the smoking initiation rate of girls aged
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made the powerful finding that a child was almost twice as likely to use
smokeless tobacco if the father was a user, than if the father was a nonuser.

17 1

Often, opponents of tobacco company sports sponsorships claim that
children idolize sports figures, such as race car drivers, and will do anything to be like them, including using tobacco. So, they conclude, banning brand-name sponsorship by tobacco companies is necessary. But,
in the Southern region of the United States, the "hot bed" of racing,

children do not behave this way. Especially of interest are the smokeless
tobacco usage rates of children from the southern states of North Caro-

lina and South Carolina, where seven Winston Cup events were held in
1997.172 One study found that North Carolina had the fourth-lowest rate
of smokeless tobacco use and that South Carolina stood seventh-lowest.' 73 In fact, the five highest rates all came from states that are not
NASCAR or IndyCar racing venues. 7 4 Another study found that com-

pared to the Southern Region, the percentage of seniors smoking daily
was nearly one-third higher in the Northeast region and nearly twice as
high in the North Central Region.175
10 to 17 years who never attended college was 1.7 times higher than those who went on to
college); see also, Luis G. Escobedo et al., Sociodemographic Characteristicsof Cigarette
Smoking Initiation in the United States, 264 JAMA 1550, 1554 (1990) (concluding that "our
findings suggest that smoking prevention should begin early and should emphasize the needs
of persons of low socioeconomic status").
171. Karl E. Bauman et al., Parent Characteristics,Perceived Health Risk, and Smokeless
Tobacco Use Among White Adolescent Males, in SMOKELESS TOBACCO USE IN THE UNrrED
STATES, at 43, 44 (U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERviCES, NAT'L CANCER INST.
MONOGRAPHS No. 8, 1989). The study found a 24.1% usage rate in children of tobacco-using
fathers versus a 12.9% usage rate for children whose fathers did not use tobacco. Id.
172. The events scheduled for this two-state region for the 35-race, 1997 Winston Cup
Series: Feb. 23, Goodwrench Service 400 (North Carolina Motor Speedway); Mar. 23,
TransSouth Financial400 (Darlington Raceway (S.C.)); May 17, The Winston Select (Charlotte
Motor Speedway (N.C.)); May 25, Coca-Cola 600 (Charlotte Motor Speedway); Aug. 31,
Mountain Dew Southern 500 (Darlington Raceway); Oct. 5, UAW-GM Quality 500 (Charlotte
Motor Speedway); Oct. 26, AC-DELCO 400 (North Carolina Motor Speedway).
173. Elbert D. Glover & Penny N. Glover, The Smokeless Tobacco Problem: Risk
Groups in North America, in SMoKELss TOBACCO OR HEALTH, supra note 1, at 3, 7, table 5
(citing MoRBmrrY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, Currenttobacco, alcohol,marijuana,and
cocaine use among high school students: United States, MMWR 40(38): 659-663 (1991)). The
rates of these two states were 8% and 9%, respectively. Id.
174. SMoKELESS TOBACCO OR HEALTH, supra note 1, at Table 4 (citing MORBimiTY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, Current tobacco, alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine use among
high school students: United States, MMWR 40(38): 659-663. (1991)). The states, in order,
were: West Virginia (20%), South Dakota (19%), Oklahoma (16%), Kentucky (16%), and
Alabama (14%). See id.
175. JomNsToN ET AL., supra note 164, at 60. The percentages were found to be as follows: North Central (23%); Northeast (21%); South (16%); and West (14%). Id.
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These lower rates of both smokeless tobacco use and smoking in the
southern region offer evidence that tobacco company motor sports sponsorships and tobacco advertisements are not making children smoke.
Additionally, the researchers, in a long-term study of Little League players, concluded that even when such a state of idolatry exists, it was not
shown to translate into the decision to initiate tobacco use, while
"[a]bout 28% of our current Little League sample (aged 12 or younger)
believes that more than half of professional players use [smokeless tobacco]... [T]his perception is not a strong discriminator between never
having used [smokeless tobacco] and having initiated [smokeless tobacco] use."' 76
Peer and family influences also play large parts in a child's decision
to use or not use tobacco. The influence of peers should not be underestimated.177 In fact, one study made the powerful finding that, "'modeling friends' smoking behavior appears to dominate the process of
adolescents' smoking initiation... After initial use, social and nonsocial
reinforcement is more likely to be experienced, and therefore, maintenance of the behavior is less dependent on imitation of others' behavior.' 1 78 In another recent study, the researchers concluded that their,
current study provides evidence that peer use of [smokeless tobacco] is the primary factor distinguishing between male adolescents who have become daily users and those who have tried it
but have not gone on to become daily users. It seems that peer
influence is important not just at onset but in the development of
a daily use pattern.' 79
176. Richard I. Evans et al., Applying the Social Inoculation Model To a Smokeless Tobacco Use Prevention Program With Little Leaguers, in SMOKELESS TOBACCO OR HEALTH,
supra note 1, at 260, 268.
177. SELINA S. GUBER & JON BERRY, MARKETING To AND THROUGH KIDS 25 (1993):
There are... tens of thousands more adult products that kids can't help but notice when
they watch TV or go into a store. How do kids decide which ones they want to have?
Product packaging; advertising; and endorsements from athletic heroes, movie stars,
and other role models all contribute to making a product stand out from the pack. But
the most important influencer for kids is their own peer group .... Kids look to their
friends as sources of information on what's in and what's out in activities, entertainment, styles, and language.

Id.
178. Brian R. Flay et al., Differential Influence of ParentalSmoking and Friends' Smoking
on Adolescent Initiationand Escalation of Smoking, 35 J. HEALTH & SOCIAL BEHAV. 248,260

(1994).
179. Dennis V. Ary, Use of Smokeless Tobacco Among Male Adolescents: Concurrentand
Prospective Relationships, in SMoKELESS TOBACCO USE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note

171, at 49, 53.
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Participation by children in school sports also corresponds with a lower
rate of smoking. 1 0
Finally, in Part VI of his opinion, in 44 Liquormart,Justice Stevens
provides guidance here as well. Justice Stevens did not accept the logic
of the State of Rhode Island that since the opinions offered on the effectiveness of the price advertising ban on promoting temperance "go both
ways," the legislature was entitled to deference by the Court.' 8 ' The
tobacco studies discussed here can arguably be described as showing that
the researchers "go both ways" on whether tobacco advertising causes
children to initiate smoking. So, as the State of Rhode Island, in 44 Liquormart,was not allowed its price advertising ban, where the evidence
supporting its position consisted of opposite conclusions, subpart D must
also be found to be an impermissible restriction of commercial speech,
under the First Amendment.
4. The FDA Regulations Are More Extensive Than Necessary
The Court in Rubin, strengthened the fourth prong of the Central
Hudson test by requiring the consideration and implementation of nonspeech alternatives, if they existed, before a ban on commercial speech
could be used.' 8 2 The Court held that "the availability of..options, all
of which could advance the Government's asserted interest in a manner
less intrusive to respondent's First Amendment rights, indicates that [the
section of the act] is more extensive than necessary."' 8 3 In 44 Liquormart,Justice Stevens followed Rubin in holding that Rhode Island's
ban on price advertising did not satisfy the fourth prong as it was "perfectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation that would not involve
any restriction on speech would be more likely to achieve the State's
goal. .. "I" Other alternative means to achieve the FDA's laudatory
goal of ending tobacco use by children are readily apparent and should
prove to achieve the FDA's goal of ending tobacco use initiation by chil180. Luis G. Escobedo et al., Sports Participation,Age at Smoking Initiation,and the Risk
of Smoking Among US High School Students, 269 JAMA 1391, 1394 (1993).
181. 44 Liquormart,Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1495, at 1510-11 (1996).
182. The Court had provided a preview of this holding two years earlier:
A regulation need not be 'absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end,'
but if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction
on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether
the 'fit' between ends and means is reasonable.
City of Cincinnativ. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993) (citing Board of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
183. Rubin v. Coors, 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1593-94 (1995).
184. 116 S. Ct. at 1510.
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dren. Before suppressing speech under subpart D, these means must be
applied, as the Court reminded us in 44 Liquormart, that "the First
Amendment directs that.. .speech restrictions cannot be treated as sim' 185
ply another means that the government may use to achieve its ends.'
a. Subpart B Forms The Alternative To Subpart D
Sections 897.14186 and 897.16,187 contained in subpart B of the regulations, deal with the accessibility issue by children, at retailers of tobacco
products, and went into effect on February 28, 1997. These sections require that each retailer verify every purchase by someone under age
twenty-seven by photographic identification,'88 and to sell only by "direct, face-to-face exchange" and not by vending machine where persons
under age eighteen are either present or allowed.

89

These regulations

do not impinge on commercial speech and are logical ways to attack the
problem of accessibility by minors to tobacco products.
In fact, the Court had already embraced this logic nearly thirty years
ago in Jacobellis v. Ohio.'90 There, a movie theater manager was con-

victed for violating a state statute, aimed at protecting minors from
obscenity, when he showed a French film. The Court reversed his conviction, concluding that the French film being shown in the theater was
not obscene. 191 The Court, in its analysis, remarked that "[s]tate and
local authorities might well consider whether their objectives in this area
would be better served by laws aimed specifically at preventing distribution of objectionable material to children, rather than at totally prohibiting its dissemination.'19
Regulations like sections 897.14 and 897.16 have already been proven
to block minors' access to tobacco in several studies performed on the
state level. In Santa Clara County, California, a study of accessibility of
tobacco to minors was made where minors were sent to 412 stores and
185. Id. at 1512.
186. Regulation of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,616 (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.14).
187. Id. at 44,616-17 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.16).
188. Id. at 44,616 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.14(b)(1),(2)).
189. Id. at 44,617 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.16(c)(1), (c)(2)(ii)). Subsection (d) of
this section will prohibit the distribution of free tobacco samples. Id. (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. § 897.16(d)). But this distribution ban, while implicating the Fifth Amendment right to
property, does not involve speech rights and therefore will not be discussed.
190. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
191. Id. at 196.
192. Id. at 195 (emphasis added).

SNUFFING OUT THE FIRST AMENDMENT

1997]

thirty vending machines to determine if they could purchase tobacco. 193
Then, both community and merchant educational campaigns were
presented to create awareness of the problem of tobacco access by minors, and a follow-up attempt to purchase tobacco from the same
sources was made six months after the campaigns. 9 4 While vending

machine sales were made to every minor who attempted to purchase
them both before and after the educational campaigns, 95 merchants
who sold tobacco to 74% of the minors before the campaigns, sold tobacco to only 39% after the campaigns. The elimination of vending machines in areas where minors can access them involves no infringement
on commercial speech and can certainly be viewed as a proper regulation. In addition, the perceived availability of cigarettes, by minors,
shows the need for uniform federal regulations on the sale and distribution of tobacco. A study done for the National Institute on Drug Abuse
reported that nearly eight in ten eighth graders reported that cigarettes
were fairly easy or very easy to get, while nearly all tenth grade students
found this same level of access to cigarettes.' 9 6 The need for the require-

ment of proof of age when selling tobacco to younger persons has also
197
been directly shown by researchers.
b.

Education Is A Strong Alternative to Subpart D

Education about tobacco use and its inherent risks forms a strong
alternative as well, and according to one researcher writing for the Journal of the American Medical Association, "[n]urturing the positive development of children and youth through education is public health's
most powerful approach to prevention."' 198 Yet, the Regulations of Ciga193. David G. Altman et al., Reducing the Illegal Sale of Cigarettesto Minors, 261 JAMA
80, 80 (1989).
194. Id. at 81.
195. Id. at 82.
196. JoHNsToN ET AL., supra note 164, at 196.
197. Tobacco Use and Usual Source of Cigarettes Among High School Students-and
United States, 1995, 66 J. SCHOOL HEALTn
222 (1996). The nationwide study found that
among smokers under age 17, 77.5% reported that they were not asked for proof of age when
buying cigarettes from a merchant in the previous thirty days. Id. at 223.
198. Carol N. D'Onofrio, Marketing Smokeless Tobacco: Implicationsfor Preventive Education, in SMOKELESS TOBACCO OR HEALTH, supra note 1, at 247, 256.
The researcher also called for adults to take responsibility:
During visits to the corner store, attendance at baseball games and other events, or
while watching the Indianapolis 500 on television, adults should point out how [smokeless tobacco] is marketed. In these conversations, adults also need to help children
understand why a bad product is so readily available, why some good people use it, and
why the Government does not ban substances that are harmful. Answering children's
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rettes and Smokeless Tobacco do not contain an educational component.
The opinions, held by children, on the risks posed by tobacco, show the
need for education programs. A government study, on smokeless tobacco use by children, found that less than half of both eighth graders
and tenth graders believed that regular use of smokeless tobacco entails
"great risk." '99 The study also found that smoking a pack or more of
cigarettes a day was believed by almost one-third of seniors to not involve great risk, while nearly half of the eighth graders and over onethird of the tenth graders in the study held that same belief.2" 0
On the state level, despite this aversion to the risks of tobacco by
children, our schools have not made education, about tobacco use risks,
a priority, as "[m]any schools provide no health education course or regularly scheduled time for health education in the curriculum... In the
war on drugs, most of the nation's schools do not identify tobacco as a
major enemy."

c.

201

Many Other Alternatives To Subpart D Also Exist

Other alternatives have already been offered, such as placing a
clearly visible warning label on all tobacco sponsorship items, from the
cars themselves to billboards at the venue.2 0 2 The Canadian Tobacco
Council also offers many alternatives in its voluntary tobacco advertising
code,20 3 such as limiting the size of the brand trademarks to no greater
than one-quarter of the size of the advertisement and no larger than the
size of the name of the event or activity being advertised.20 4 This code
was developed and instituted by the council members after the Canadian
Supreme Court overturned a government ban on the advertising of to-

questions about [smokeless tobacco] is likely to require explaining history, politics, government, law, economics, and other complex aspects of society.
The educational challenge is formidable, but if young people are to make wise decisions about [smokeless tobacco], both as individuals and as community members,
adults in all walks of life must rise to the task.

Id.
199.

JOHNSTON ET AL.,

supra note 164, at 155, table 19.

200. Id.
201. D'Onofrio, supra note 198, at 248-49.
202. Stoner, supra note 46, at 668.
203. The Tobacco Industry Voluntary Packaging and Adverting Code of the Canadian
Tobacco Manufacturers' Council (amended 1996) (on file with the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council).
204. Id. at Section 4.3.
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bacco products." 5 Before its ban was overturned, Canada was one of 221
0 6
countries that, as of 1994, had a complete ban on tobacco advertising.
Counter-advertising, which was so successful in the 1960s, 20 7 forms
another alternative. However, the government must find funding for
such advertising on its own, as "where the State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming
the courier for such message."20° Justice Stevens mentioned the possibility of counter-speech as an alternative in 44 Liquormart.°9 Children do
pay attention to counter-messages, with one study's findings showing
that more than 90% of both non-smokers and smokers aged 11-19 years
old who saw anti-smoking messages on television thought that such advertisements made people aware that smoking is dangerous, and over
half of both smokers and non-smokers felt that these messages made
people want to quit smoking. 210 Perhaps more important, peer pressure
to use tobacco may be overcome by such messages, as almost 72% of
smokers and more than 80% of non-smokers thought that those
messages made non-smokers tell smokers, their peers, to quit.211 No
matter the alternative or alternatives chosen, commercial speech must
not be suppressed by subpart D when these and other alternatives exist.
Notwithstanding the constitutional problems, children themselves offer evidence that section 897.30 will not help the FDA achieve its goal of
ending tobacco use by children. A survey of teenagers conducted recently revealed that even when children remember tobacco billboards,
including Joe the Camel, they are not persuaded to start smoking.212 In
205. RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 100 C.C.C. 3d 449 (1995).
206.

CLARE CHOLLAT-TRAQUET, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, EVALUATING To-

BACCO CONTROL AcrivrnEs 112 (1996).

207. See discussion supra Section III(A).
208. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).

209. 44 Liquormart,116 S.Ct. at 1510.
210. Samuel W. Monismith et al., Opinions of Seventh to Twvelfth Graders Regarding the
Effectiveness of Pro- and Anti-Smoking Messages, in DRUG ABUSE: FOUNDATION FOR A
PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACH, at 209,216 (Seymour Eiseman et al. eds., 1984). The book focus is
on drug abuse education using a psychosocial approach rather than a medical approach.
211. Id.
212. Bruce Horovitz and Melanie Wells, Ads For Adult Vices Big Hit With Teens, USA
TODAY, Jan. 31, 1997, at 1A,2A (reporting that fewer than two in ten teens were persuaded
by Joe the Camel to try Camel cigarettes); see also, Melanie Wells, Kids Know Joe Camel, but
they follow Marlboro Man, USA TODAY, Jan. 31, 1997, at 5B (reporting that Marlboro is
preferred by more teenage smokers even though Joe Camel ads are liked better and are more
recognized; reporting that 83% of the teenagers said Camel ads do not make them want to
use the brand, 78% said the same for Marlboro ads, and over 90% said the same for the
brands Kool, Benson & Hedges, and Lucky Strike).
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another study, only 13.6% of non-smoking teenagers ages 11-19 who reported seeing ads on billboards or in magazines that made smoking look
attractive said that those ads made them want to smoke, again showing
the lack of a direct connection between advertising and smoking
initiation.213
B. Subpart D Involves Viewpoint and Content-Based Discrimination
Viewpoint discrimination has been described as existing when,
government makes the point of view of the speaker central to its
decision to impose, or not to impose, some penalty... [T]he government is trying to protect a preferred side in a debate and to
ban the side that it dislikes... We know that we are dealing with
a viewpoint-based restriction if and only if the government has
silenced one side in a debate.214
Viewpoint-based restrictions are a "subset" of content-based restrictions,215 as "the government cannot silence one side in a debate without
making content crucial."2 6 In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,21 7 a decision concerning the protected speech category of music, the Court explained that "[tihe principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in
speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular,
is whether the government has adopted a regulation
of speech because
21 8
of disagreement with the message it conveys.

Tobacco advertisements and sports sponsorships express tobacco use,
something that the government wishes to "silence" to protect children.
But, the other side of the debate, consisting primarily of the FDA, the
Surgeon General, the FCC, and the FTC, but also of numerous privately
213. Monismith et al., supra note 210, at 217.
214. CASS R. SuNsTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 12 (1993).
215. Id. Content-based restrictions have been defined as follows:
[This restriction is] viewpoint neutral but content-based. For example, the government
might ban all political speech in a certain plae... But the viewpoint of the speaker is
not crucial, or even relevant, to the restriction ... In a sense, such a restriction has a
degree of neutrality.
Id.
216. Id.
217. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). The Court was faced with a city guideline on sound amplification for a bandshell in Central Park. The justification given for the guideline was the control
of noise levels to avoid disrupting the surrounding park areas. The Court held that such a
restriction on speech "satisfies the requirement that time, place, or manner regulations be
content neutral." Id. at 792.
218. Id. at 791 (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, at
295 (1984)). See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). There, the Court held that "[t]he
First Amendment does not permit [a government] to impose special prohibitions on those
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects." Id. at 391 (citations omitted).
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funded anti-tobacco groups,2 1 9 remains free to run any type of
anti-tobacco advertisement that it can design, with no limitations on its
content, format, message, or sponsorship connections. For instance, the
FDA could sponsor a NASCAR race team with the team name of "Tobacco Kills" on its hood. 220 Subpart D shows that it discriminates based
on content, by its prohibitions, on the use of colors or brand names, by
tobacco companies, in their advertisements and sponsorships. 221
When the protection of children is at issue, however, the Court has
sometimes allowed viewpoint and content-based restrictions. FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation2 2 2 involved the FCC's characterization of comedian
George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue broadcast, over the afternoon radio airwaves, as "patently offensive." 2' Finding that the broadcast occurred "when children were undoubtedly in the audience," the
FCC prohibited its broadcast at that time of the day. 224 The Court
agreed, holding that "[t]he ease with which children may obtain access to
broadcast material... justif[ies] special treatment of indecent broadcasting."225 The Court thus allowed a time, place, or manner restriction on
speech. But in Ward, the Court explained that "the government may
impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions 'are justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech.... "226 Subpart D restricts commercial speech which is not indecent, unlike Pacifica Foundation, based
on its content.2 27 Further, in Edenfield, while discussing the third prong
of the CentralHudson test, the Court declared that "[w]here a restriction
on speech lacks.. .[a] close and substantial relation to the governmental
interests asserted, it cannot be, by definition, a reasonable time, place or
manner restriction."22' 8 As subpart D has already been shown to fail the
219. Northeastern University's "Tobacco Products Liability Project," which monitors lawsuits against the industry, has become a well-known foe of tobacco companies, replete with
their own Worldwide Web Page. A prominent face on Capitol Hill is the "Campaign for
Tobacco-Free Kids" lobbying group.
220. It would readily be agreed that sans forming their own team, the opponents of tobacco would find it difficult to get a race team to carry such a slogan on its car, in light of the
fact that the success of racing is largely due to the tobacco industry's sponsorship dollars.
221. Supra text accompanying notes 7-11.
222. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
223. Id. at 731.
224. Id. at 732.
225. Id. at 750.
226. 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, at 293 (1984)).
227. See discussion infra note 244-60 and accompanying text.
228. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 773.
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third prong of Central Hudson, as modified by Justice Stevens in 44 Li229 it can not qualify as such a restriction.
quormart,
But, in Bethel School District v. Fraserz ° another decision by the
Court allowing a restriction on speech to protect children, a public high
school was allowed to set limitations on the content of student elective
office nomination speeches. The Court carved out an exception to the
First Amendment when it remarked that while:
[t]he First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters of
adult public discourse... [i]t does not follow... that simply be-

cause the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political
point, the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public
school.231
But, subpart D does not involve a speech restriction in a public
school setting. Instead, it restricts speech that the adult public would
view, not just children. Still, the ability of a legislature to protect children, in spite of an impingement on the First Amendment, was also
given approval by the Court in Ginsberg v. New York."3 There, the
Court stated that "[t]he well-being of its children is of course a subject
But, the Court
within the State's constitutional power to regulate...,,
in Ginsberg was dealing with a statute that prohibited anyone from selling materials containing obscene pictures, and obscenity is not protected
speech, 23 4 unlike the commercial speech restricted by subpart D.
Importantly, under several other decisions of the Court dealing with
the protection of children, in the commercial speech context, subpart D
fails to withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment. In seeking to
protect children, while upholding commercial free speech under the First
Amendment, the Court in Butler v. Michigan235 held that the state could
not "reduce the adult population... to reading only what is fit for children."' 36 In Butler, the defendant was convicted of selling a book containing material that, in the opinion of the trial court judge, would
corrupt youths in an immoral way, thus violating a state penal code provision against the sale of such material to any person, no matter the
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See discussion supra Section VI(A)(3).
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Id. at 682.
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
Id. at 639.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
352 U.S. 380 (1957).
Id. at 383.
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age . 37 The Court dismissed the State's argument that the code was constitutional: "The State insists that, by thus quarantining the general
reading public against books not too rugged for grown men and women
in order to shield juvenile innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general welfare. Surely, this is to bum the house to roast the
238

pig:'

Then, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 9 the local government
sought to protect minors by enacting an ordinance that prohibited a
drive-in movie theater, whose screens were visible from the street, from
showing films containing nudity. However, the Court held that
[s]peech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some
other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks
unsuitable for them. In most circumstances, the values protected
by the First Amendment are no less applicable when government
seeks to control the flow of information to minors.2 40
More recently, in Sable Communications v. FCC,241 the Court struck
down a federal statute that banned "dial-a-porn" telephone messages,
holding that such legislation, "has the invalid effect of limiting the content of adult telephone conversations to that which is suitable for children to hear, '24 2 and represented "another case of 'burn[ing] up the
house to roast the pig,"' and was therefore unconstitutional. 243
1. Children, Speech Restrictions, and Section 897.34 of Subpart D
Under Butler, Erznoznik, and Sable Communications, the limits on
merchandising and sports sponsorships found under section 897.34244 are
impermissible viewpoint and content-based restrictions of commercial
speech. Winston racing apparel does not even come in children's sizes or
even in an adult small.24 Perhaps most powerful to the analysis under
237. Id. at 381.
238. Id. at 383. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983)

(prong three of Central Hudson could not be met as the Court, pointing out that "parents
must already cope with the multitude of external stimuli that color their children's perception
of sensitive subjects," held that a "marginal degree of protection is achieved by purging all
mailboxes of unsolicited material that is entirely suitable for adults").
239. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
240. Id. at 213-14 (citations and footnote omitted).
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
SERVER,

492 U.S. 115 (1989).
Id. at 131.
Id. (quoting Butler, 352 U.S. at 383).
See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
Gerald Martin, NASCAR Not Running Scared Yet, RALEIGH NC NEws & OB-

Aug. 24, 1996, at Al.
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these decisions is that persons under age eighteen make up only three
percent of the NASCAR demographic.246 Under Sable, this section "has
the invalid effect of limiting the content [of sponsorships] to that which is
suitable for children..., 247 Furthermore, borrowing from Sable's predecessor Butler, "[s]urely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig. ' 248
2. Children, Speech Restrictions, and Section 897.32 of Subpart D
The restrictions on the format and content of advertisements under
section 897.32 ignore the Court's holding in Sable Communications.
While subsection (a)(1) and (a)(2) of section 897.32249 create exceptions
for the "tombstone" restrictions on tobacco advertisements created by
the section, the requirements to be met before an advertisement can be
placed will prove, in actual practice, to violate the First Amendment protection given commercial speech by "limiting the content... to that which
is suitable for children...

."2

The difficulty of measuring the percent-

age and number of readers under age eighteen, required under subsection (a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(ii) respectively,"5 to avoid the format
restriction, will serve to predetermine the violation.
3. Children, Speech Restrictions, and Section 897.30 of Subpart D
A zone of protection around schools against tobacco advertising is
created by section 897.30. 52 The Court has previously shown its approval for similar restrictions when the purpose is to protect children,25 3
246. Gerald Martin, NASCAR Backing Tobacco, RALEIGH NC NEws & OBSERVER, Aug.
18, 1995, at C1 (citing research by Simmons Research Bureau).
247. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989).
248. Butler, 352 U.S. at 383.
249. See supra text accompanying note 10.
250. 492 U.S. at 131.
251. See supra text accompanying note 10.
252. See supra text accompanying note 11.
253. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (city ordinance on adult movie theaters prohibited their locating within 1000 feet of residential areas,
churches, parks and schools was upheld); see, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50 (1976) (banning adult theaters and other commercial uses from within 500 feet of
residential areas and from within 1000 feet of other "regulated uses" allowable under the First
Amendment to accomplish city's interest in planning and regulating the use of property); see,
e.g., Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932) (Utah statute allowing tobacco product advertising only in newspapers and periodicals but not in billboards, street car signs, and placards
upheld due to its agreement with precedent that the banned mediums presented captive audience problems); see, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (ban on
political advertising covering the city transit system which still allowed all other types of advertising was upheld as the city was seeking to accomplish the proper objective of avoiding the
imposition of political views on the captive audiences in the transit cars).
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and soon after its decision in 44 Liquormart,the Court accepted certiorari for two companion Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals cases that had
upheld billboard advertising bans that sought to protect children.' 54 The
Court remanded both cases for review in light of its decision in 44 Liquormart. On remand, the Fourth Circuit considered Anheuser Busch,
Inc. v. Schmoke as representative of the companion cases. Claiming to
have applied 44 Liquormart, the court reasoned that "[i]n contrast to
Rhode Island's desire to enforce adult temperance through an artificial
budgetary constraint, Baltimore's interest is to protect children who are
not yet independently able to assess the value of the message
presented."'- '5 Calling the restriction one of "time, place and manner,"
the court again affirmed the district court judgment. 2 6 The court reaffirmed Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore for the reasons given in the companion case.257 But, under
the Court's reasoning in Jacobellis, the dissemination of tobacco billboard advertising, around school zones, is impermissible when the sale
and distribution of tobacco products in that same zone is still permitted.
The FDA's purpose of ending tobacco use by children, "would be better
served by laws aimed specifically at preventing distribution of objectionable material to children, rather than at totally prohibiting its dissemina2 8 Children do not spend their time staring at billboards dreaming
tion."'"
of cigarettes when they can instead walk around the comer and buy
them.
The dissent of Senior Circuit Judge Butzner presented the correct
analysis, under 44 Liquormart,for these cases on remand.25 9 He pointed
to the failure of the court to "[answer] the third and fourth inquiries of
Central Hudson. To obtain a sound basis for deciding these inquiries,
2' 60
district and reviewing courts need factual records.

254. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305 (1995), rev'd and remanded, 116 S.
Ct. 1821 (1996); see also, Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc., v. Mayor of Baltimore et al., 63 F.3d
1318 (1995), rev'd and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996).
255. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 329 (1996), cert. denied, 1997 WL
120533 (U.S.).
256. Id. at 330.
257. 101 F.3d 325, at 332 (1996), cert denied, 1997 WL 120537 (U.S.).
258. Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (emphasis added).
259. 101 F.3d at 330-32 (Butzner, dissenting).
260. Id. at 331.
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CONCLUSION

The issues surrounding tobacco use arguably form the most active
public debate this century. After the FDA announced its proposed
rule,2 6 ' over 700,000 public comments were made to the FDA.2 62 Over
twenty reports of the Surgeon General on tobacco and health and an
estimated 40,000 published articles and books have served to document
this debate.2 6 3 As Congress considers the proposed settlement, on one
extreme are those who argue that tobacco advertising should find no
protection at all under the First Amendment.2 " On the other extreme,
one commentator has proposed that, given the intensely political nature
of the debate, tobacco advertising should not be viewed by the Court as
commercial speech, but rather, as political speech and thus fully
protected.265

A debate over how much protection free speech should receive,
under the First Amendment, has been raging on since at least 1925.266
Today, many of the debates that once involved only political speech
cases, "have a strikingly different character. They involve free speech
claims by owners of restaurants featuring nude dancing... [and] by tobacco companies objecting to restrictions on cigarette advertising...26
261. Regulation of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995) (finalized Aug. 28, 1996).
262. Preface to Regulation of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396
(1996).
263. David Satcher & Michael Eriksen, The Paradoxof Tobacco Control,271 JAMA 627,
627 (1994).
264. Compare Kenneth L. Polin, Article, Argument For The Ban Of Tobacco Advertising:
A FirstAmendment Analysis, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 99, 100 (1988) (arguing that "tobacco advertising... is inherently misleading, if not fraudulent, and/or relates to criminal activity (i.e.
the sale of tobacco to minors).... .") (footnotes omitted), and Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: "Too Much Puff" Persuasion,Paternalism, and
Commercial Speech, 56 U. CiN.L Rv. 1205, 1224 (1988) ("the informational content of most
cigarette advertising is negligible"), with Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the
First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEx. L. RFv.
777, 780 (1993) (in part responding to Lowenstein's argument, remarks that "[t]he theoretical
question should not be what qualifies commercial speech for First Amendment coverage, but
what, if anything, disqualifies it").
265. Richards, supra note 78, at 1210. He argues that:
Tobacco ads and related promotions differ from other commercial speech on several
dimensions, and they definitely involve subject matter of the highest public interest and
concern. Although many will balk at the idea of awarding such status to marketing
communications of any kind -let alone tobacco products - cigarette advertising appears
to meet the necessary conditions for protection as fully protected speech.
Id.
266. SUNSEIN, supra note 214, at 4-5.
267. Id. at 2.
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The boundaries of protection that have been made by the Court in
deciding political speech cases under the First Amendment are rather
remarkable. While placing limits on this right to free speech, 268 the
Court has upheld this right in allowing flag burning;269 in allowing a citizen, protesting the Vietnam War draft, to wear a jacket emblazoned with
an obscenity in public, in front of children;270 and in striking down a city
ordinance that criminalized cross burning. 271

The four opinions in 44 Liquormart,while divergent in their analysis
of how to arrive at what constitutes the proper amount of commercial
speech protection, but each one giving heightened protection in some
manner, 72 all serve to reveal that future decisions of the Court should
prove to make out enlarged boundaries for commercial speech protection under the First Amendment. Dr. David A. Kessler, who resigned
his position as FDA Commissioner just months after the regulations
were finalized, believes, along with other anti-tobacco proponents, that
these regulations wiii help the FDA meet its mission of protecting the
public health because, as less children take up tobacco use, the number
of adults addicted to nicotine will progressively decrease, as those children age. 73 While ending tobacco use by children is a goal that should
be supported by all, we can not allow the First Amendment to be snuffed
out as the means to accomplish that end.

268. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,572 (1942) ("fighting words" will not be
protected under the First Amendment).
269. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). See also, United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S.

310 (1990) (Congress's Flag Protection Act of 1989 held unconstitutional).
270. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (on the jacket were the words "Fuck the
Draft.")
271. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
272. See discussion supra Section IV(C).
273. David A. Kessler et al., The Food and DrugAdministration'sRegulation of Tobacco
Products, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 988, 993 (1996). The authors further assert that the goal of
the FDA Regulations "is to cut the use of tobacco among young people by half over a sevenyear period." Id.

